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I. INTRODUCTION
I deal in Land Values and Sales
of green-belted plots
In desirable spots
and with all that town planning entails
and if Anyone anything's got
In the way of garden or plot-
Well he mustn't object
When I call to collect
About half of the whole blooming lot.
Sir Desmond Heap1
Value capture policy is as old as eminent domain, which means it is
very nearly as old as organized government. Nevertheless there is some-
how something threatening about pulling it all together under the title of
"policy" dealing with the "capture" of "value." Capture from whom?
Whose value? Whose policy?
In fact, value capture is very little more than government using its
existing powers to acquire land or rights in land for a public purpose and
then defraying the costs of acquisition by dealing in those values and
capitalizing on increased value the government itself created by virtue of
its public developmental activities. The theory of value capture policy has
been dealt with at some length elsewhere 2 In this article it is the intent of
the authors to present a technique-by-technique analysis of practical
applications of value capture policy with theoretical discussions only
where necessary. For convenience we have divided the "methodology" of
value capture policy into four categories: (1) condemnation of land for
value capture, (2) development of existing rights in land, (3) monetary
transfers, and (4) joint development. These categories are preceded by
an extended discussion of public purpose and public use-the legal keys
to most of the techniques. While much of the research which forms the
basis of this article was done for the purpo-se of examining the feasibility of
using value capture techniques to defray the costs of fixed-guideway
rapid transit systems,3 many of the examples from cases, statutes and
experience, are drawn from other contexlts-highways, redevelopment,
parking structures, shopping malls, and the like.
1. Christmas Extravaganza and Fun Fair Department, 1966 J. PLAN. L. 693.
2. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, A VALUE CAPTURE POLICY, (vols. 1-4,19); Callies and
Deurksen, Value Recapture as A Source of Funds to Finance Public Projects, 8 URBAN LAW ANN.
73, 81-83 (1974); Callies and Deurksen, Value Recapture: A Rose By Another Name, 26 ZONING
DIG. 5 (1974).
3. The research was funded primarily by the U.S. Department of Transportation's Urban
Mass Transit Administration and later the Denver'Regional Transit District. Planning and financial
analysis was performed by the Rice Center for Comnmunity Design and Research in Houston,
Texas, under the direction of Carl P. Sharpe, Assistant Director, and Robert Eury, principal
planner.
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Usually government does not attempt to "go it alone" but rather forms
public-private partnerships so that both sectors can benefit from govern-
mental development. The central theory, however, remains the same. In
each instance it is an investment of public funds for which a "capture" of
some of the value created by the investment which traditionally accrued to
private interests is sought in order to help defray the outlay of public
funds. 4
II. PUBLIC USE
The efficacy of valu a capture policies involving public participation in
development opportunities along a transit route will be largely dependent
upon the acquisition of property for development or the development of
property already acquired. Such acquisition and use is subject to the
constitutional and statutory constraints of the "public use" doctrine. This
doctrine is sufficiently important that we deal with it in considerable detail,
despite our avowed intent to focus on the more practical aspects of value
capture.
A. EMINENT DOMAIN
Generally a public body can acquire property through the exercise of
the power of eminent domain for public use or purposes. The breadth of
the definition of "public jse"-what is appropriate, direct, and related to
governmental purposes--will, to a large measure, be determinative of the
potential for value capture through public/private partnerships.
1. Public purpose.
The matter of public use and purpose has been often defined in the
context of the acquisition of property not strictly needed for the purposes
for which a governmental entity was created. For example, in the case of a
transit district developing a fixed guideway system, enabling legislation
and common sense dictate that the agency can acquire the property
necessary for the construction of a fixed guideway and stations. Acquisi-
tion of land for commuter parking is also generally includable. Permissible
acquisitions beyond these types of uses depend upon constitutional,
statutory, and interpretive case law.
United States v. 416.81 Acres of Land 5 contains an example of a
broad definition of public use which is typical of situations involving the
federal government. The government brought eminent domain proceed-
ings to acquire land for development of the Indiana Dunes National
4. The extent to which private landowners may be the fortuitous beneficiary of significant
value without effort or investment is dramatically illustrated in an article published in Planning
Magazine. Toner, Oysters and ihe Good Ole' Boys, PLANNING MAGAZINE, August (1975).
5. 514 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1975).
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Lakeshore. The court held that the only question for judicial review in such
a condemnation proceeding was whether the purpose for which the
property was taken was a congressionally authorized public purpose. It
made no difference that a landowner's conception of a public use might
differ from that of the Congress.6
As clearly demonstrated in a recent Maryland case, broad definitions
of public use are not confined to cases involving the, power of the federal
government. In Prince George's County v. Colington Crossroads, Inc.,7
the county sought to condemn land at the intersection of two major
highways for the creation of an industrial park. The court was not swayed
by the ultimate private use or benefits that accompanied the "economic
stimulation" of the proposed development and recognized the necessity
for a non-rigid definition of public use.
Over many years and in a multitude of cases the courts have vainly
attempted to define comprehensively the concept of a public use and to
formulate a universal test. They have found here as elsewhere that to
formulate anything ultimate, even though it were possible, would, in an
inevitably changing world, be unwise if not futile. [citations omitted]8
2. Necessity.
The courts have long drawn a distinction between what is a public
purpose on the one hand and necessity of the taking on the other. Public
purpose is largely a question of why or what for, while necessity is one of
how, much or which one. In most non-federal jurisdictions the "what for"
public purpose question is strictly a judicial question.
In evaluating the use for which a gcvernmental body attempts to
exercise the power of eminent domain, the courts have the responsibility of
enforcing the constitutional limitation that the use must be 'public. '9
On the other hand, the issue of necessity is clearly perceived as a matter
of legislative discretion and is reviewed by the courts only for evidence of
fraud, collusion or bad faith. In ARCO Pipeline Co. v. 3.6OAcres of Land,10
builders of the Trans-Alaska pipeline brought proceedings to condemn
3.6 acres of right-of-way under authority delegated to it by the State of
Alaska. The court held it was without authority to review the question of
6. Id.
7. 275 Md. 171, 339 A.2d 278 (Md.Ct.App. 1975).
8. Id. 275 Md. at 177, 339 A.2d at 286, quoting Fiden v. Philadelphia B. & W. Ry. Co., 182
Md. 336, 35 A.2d 99 (1943).
9. Prince George's City v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 177, 339 A 2d 278,
283 (Md. Ct. App. 1975). See also City of Little Rock v Raines, 241 Ark. 1071, 411 S.W.2d 486
(Ark. 1967); In re Flatbush Ave, 60 Misc. 2d 1062, 304 N.Y.S.2d 552, 556 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
10. 539 P.2d 64 (Alaska 1975).
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necessity of a particular t:aking absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith,
arbitrariness or abuse o discretion. 11
In a case from California dealing with the authority of an airport
commission and city council to condemn property for the extension and
enlargement of an airpcrt, the Court of Appeals of California held that
whether public necessihy required acquisition of property for such an
extension and enlargement was strictly a legislative and not a judicial
question and that legislative motive was not a subject of inquiry.12
Recently the wooden distinction between public use and necessity
has become blurred as courts have recognized an expanding definition of
public purpose. The courts have given increasing credence to the import-
ance of comprehensive development or redevelopment projects essen-
tial to the health, safety and welfare of the public. In State exrelAtkinson v.
Planned Industrial Expansion Auth.,13 the court pierced through the
formalistic jargon of "public purpose" and "necessity," reconciling them
as follows:
[F]inal determination of the question whether the contemplated use of any
property sought to be taken under the Law here in question is public rests
upon the courts, but that a legislative finding under said law that a blighted
or unsanitary area exists and that the legislative agency proposes to take
the property therein undetr the process of eminent domain for the purpose of
clearance and improvement and subsequent sale upon such terms and
restrictions as it may dEem in the public interest will be accepted by the
courts as conclusive evidence that the contemplated use thereof is public,
unless it further appears upon allegation and clear proof that the legislative
finding was arbitrary or was induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith.14
The distinction between "public benefit," and "public purpose" is
also fading with the passage of time. In an increasing number of jurisdic-
tions public benefits like revenue generation, are accepted as valid public
purposes. A Maryland ccurt recently held:
Under our cases, projests reasonably designed to benefit the general
public, by significantly e ihancing the economic growth of the State, or its
subdivisions, are public uses, at least where the exercise of the power of
condemnation provides an impetus which private enterprise cannot
provide.1 s
In Florida, an apparent holdout jurisdiction, however, the distinction
seems to be alive and well. A court recently noted that 'public benefit' is
not synonomous with 'puOlic purpose' as a predicate which can justify
11. Id. at 68.
12. Breiner v. City of Los Argeles, 22 Cal. App. 3d 382 (1975), 99 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1972).
13. 517 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. 1975).
14. Id. at 45.
15, Prince George's City v Crossroads, Inc., supra 275 Md. at-, 339 A.2d at 289.
(emphasis added).
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eminent domain .... ",16 Thus, in the final analysis, the breadth of the
definitions of public use and public purpose depend upon the constitu-
tional, statutory and case law provisions of the particular jurisdiction
involved.
3. Colorado.
Colorado is a useful example, since the Denver Regional Transit
District has recently gone through the exercise of evaluating value cap-
ture techniques.17 From a reading of the law in Colorado it appears that,
while the constitution and statutes are sufficiently strict to place Colorado
in the narrow view jurisdictions, interpretive case law reveals an occa-
sional judicial willingness to move away from a narrow interpretation of
"public use."
The Colorado constitution provides in pertinent part:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use
without just compensation. . . the question whether the contemplated use
be really public shall be a judicial question and determined as such without
regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public."l
In addition, the constitution further provides at section 14:
Taking private property for private use.
Private property shall not be taken for private use unless by consent of the
owner, except for private ways and necE ssity and except for reservoirs,
drains, flumes or ditches on or across the lands of others by agricultural,
mining, milling, domestic or sanitary purposes. 19
Of course, in order to validate condemnation for public/private
development schemes in support of a "apid transit district it is always
possible to amend the aforesaid section 14 to add matters relating to rapid
transit districts. We understand that such an amendment is a remote
possibility and therefore suggest that any exercise of the power of eminent
domain would need to satisfy a public purpose test bottomed on article II,
section 15 of the Colorado constitution.
This constitutional provision was examined in Potashnik v. Public
Service Commission of Colorado,20 where the court said:
Whatever may have been the ancient right of condemnation, it has been
restrained by constitutional limitations in the protection of individual pro-
perty rights. The power lies dormant in the state until the legislature speaks
[citing authorities]. . . .The right to condemn private property is therefore
16. Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Development Auth., 315 So.2d 451, 457 (Fla. 1975).
17. DENVER RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT, R.T.D. NORTH SOUTH RAPID TRANSIT PROJECT, VALUE
CAPTURE OPPORTUNITIES (Report, 1976).
18. COLO CONST. art. II, § 15.
19. COLO CONST. art. II, § 14.
20. 126 Colo. 98, 247 P.2d 137 (1952).
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a creature of statute, pursuant to which it must clearly appear either by
express grant or by necessary implication. 21
After quoting article II, section 15 of the Colorado constitution the
court noted that:
[T]he actual purpose of this section is to place a limitation even upon
legislative enactment. Under the restriction of this section the legislature
itself must exercise cara in declaring to be a'public use' (and hence entitled
to the right of eminent domain) only that which may meet the legal tests of
such as determined by the judiciary. The general right of eminent domain,
under our Constitution, depends upon, first, legislative authority and,
second, judicial approval of the purpose as a public use.22
Fortunately for proponents of public/private partnership value cap-
ture techniques, later decisions seem to broaden the power of a public
body to acquire land by eminent domain in Colorado. For example, the
Supreme Court of Colorado, stating that the question of public purpose in
condemnation proceeding was a judicial question, upheld a taking for a
pipeline right-of-way as a public purpose.23 The court quoted extensively
from a 1906 Supreme Court of Colorado decision, Tanner v. Treasury
Tunnel Mining & Reduction Co.,24 where the court discussed the impor-
tance that the definition of public purpose change with the times.25 In
addition, the Larsen court quoted the following language from Tanner:
No definition, however, has as yet been formulated which would serve
as an infallible test in cletermining whether a use of property sought to be
appropriated under the power of eminent domain is public or private. No
precise line is drawn between the uses which would be applicable in all
cases. Doubtless this arises from the fact that the courts have recognized
21. Id. 247 P.2d at 138.
22. Id. 247 P.2d at 139, 140.
23. Larsen v. Chase Pipeline Company, 183 Colo. 76, 514 P.2d 1316 (1973).
24. 35 Colo. 593, 83 P. 4E4 (1906).
25. Id. at 35 Colo. 594, 83 P. 464 at 465.
In this state we have conditions to meet and resources to develop, which, in their
nature, require the employment of new and appropriate means. This has opened a
field for the prosecution on new enterprises. The mineral resources of the state are of
prime importance. Generally they can only be reached by sinking shafts to great
depth, or running tunnels of great length."
The general assembly has provided for the organization of companies for the purposes for
which the petitioner was organized. It has provided that a corporation of this character may
exercise the power of eminent domain in securing rights-of-way for its tunnel. It has evidently
recognized that the business of a tunnel company may be for the benefit and advantage of the
public, for we find that in designating what corporations may exercise the power of eminent
domain tunnel companies have been mentioned in connection with bridge, ferry, railroad, and
other companies whose business is unquestionably to serve the public. While this judgment is
not conclusive upon the courts, it is entitled to careful consideration and great weight as the
judgment of a coordinate branch of the government or the necessities of the state for the
development of its resources ard the needs of the people in this respect. [citing cases]
Subject to the authority of the court to determine certain questions, the general
assembly is the exclusive julge of the necessity or emergency justifying the exercise of
the power of eminent domein. (emphasis added).
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the definition of public use must be such as to give it a degree of elasticity
capable of meeting new conditions and improvements and the ever-
increasing needs of society. [Citing case] Consequently we find, in
examining the authorities, that, in determining whether or not a use is
public, the physical conditions of the country, the needs of a community,
the character of a benefit which a projected improvement may confer upon
a locality, and the necessities for such improvement in the development of
the resources of a state, are to be taken into consideration.
26
Arguably at least, the Larsen case places Colorado in the broader
view public purpose camp despite the Colorado constitutional provisions
which, upon first reading, imply a narrow "public purpose" definition.
In Dallasta v. Department of Highways,27 a case dealing with a
proposed condemnation by the State Highway Department, the court
established the following test:
[It] is the general principal of law that courts will not disturb decisions or
determination by public bodies charged with the duty as to location or
alignment of highways or other public projects. The feasibility or practica-
bility of the same and similar objectives-all of which relate to the necessity
for the acquisition of a particular property--is the agency's responsibility to
determine. To invoke the judiciary there must be a showing of bad faith or
fraud on the part of the acquiring agency. This rule has been uniformally
[sic] recognized by this court, even when objection is raised in condemna-
tion cases by persons whose property is actually being taken.
28
The court seems to be applying traditional deference toward the necessity
of the taking to the definition of public purpose and thereby reflecting the
modern trend towards a blurring of any distinction.
In Rabinoff v. District Court,29 the Colorado Supreme Court consi-
dered whether condemnation of property for conveyance to private
parties under an urban renewal plan was a public use:
The narrow inquiry therefore, is whether the power of eminent domain
can be exercised in circumstances such as the present, wherein the public
authority does not intend to permanently retain the property which it pro-
poses to condemn.
30
The court concluded in the affirmative:
In concluding that the proposed action is public and not private, we are
persuaded not only by the underlying object of urban renewal, but the
significant fact that the grant is to a public agency which acquires the lands
in question under a master plan of rehabilitation. The fact of ultimate
ownership by private individuals is an incidental and secondary considera-
tion to the public objectives.31
26. Id.
27. 153 Colo. 519, 387 P.2d 25 (1963).
28. Id. at 521, 387 P.2d at 27.
29. 145 Colo. 225, 360 P.2d 114 (1961).
30. Id. at 229, 360 P.2d at 118,
31. Id. at 232, 360 P.2d at 121.
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While none of the above cases is dispositive of the breadth of "public
purpose" in Colorado, they suggest that Colorado courts have been
receptive to broad application of condemnation powers and might be
expected to view a tran:3it district's exercise of its eminent domain powers
in furtherance of a pub ic/private partnership value capture scheme in a
progressive manner.32
B. PUBLIC FUNDS
Closely related to the concept of "public purpose" in eminent domain
proceedings is the use of public funds to carry out development tradition-
ally reserved for the pivate sector. In this area as well, a broadening
concept of the public interest is overcoming traditional distinctions. A
recent Massachusetts case is on point. Opinion of the Justices3 3 dealt with
a proposed statute providing for the financing, construction and operation
by the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority of a stadium complex, vehicular
tunnel, toll road and arena in Boston. The Supreme Court of Mas-
sachusetts held that the proposed statute was invalid, not because the
proposal went beyond certain specified public purposes, but because
the expenditure of pub ic funds, extension of public privileges, powers,
exemptions and uses, and the rental and operation of the project involved,
were inadequately controlled by appropriate standards and principles.
The court went on to set out at some length what standards and principles
would render such a statute adequate. The court characterized the
standards challenged as "vague and frigmentary," 34 but specifically
held:
We are of opinion that 3 large multi-purpose stadium or an arena for public
activities and events conventions, professional and amateur athletic
events and other large gatherings may be for a public purpose if the
expenditure of public f inds, the extension of public privileges, powers, and
exemptions, and the use, rental, and operation of the projects are ade-
quately governed by appropriate standards and principles set out in the
legislation. [1]f the legislation itself contains standards and principles
governing and guiding the operation of the facilities in a manner which
reasonably can be ex 3ected adequately (a) to protect all aspects of the
public interest and (b) to guard against improper diversion of public funds
and privileges for the benefit of private persons and entities, then such
enterprises may be foind to be for public objectives.35
To the same general effect is Lerch v. Maryland Port Authority.36
There the validity of a proposed issue of revenue bonds by the port
32. See, 2A, NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, § 7.5161 (3d ed 1975).
33. 356 Mass. 751, 250 Mi.E.2d 547 (1969).
34. Id. at 763, 250 N.E.2d at 559.
35. Id.
36. 240 Md. 438, 214 A.2d 761 (1965).
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authority for acquisition and construction of an international trade center
was challenged. The court held that the use of property to produce
revenues to help finance operation of activities that tended to achieve the
purpose of a trade center development project in the Port of Baltimore was
a public use.
The court noted specifically that the methods by which a public
purpose may be served by a municipal corporation changes with time and
that at present services were more important than edifices. There was a
specific legislative finding that the location of servicing functions and
activities connected with commerce and trade at a single centrally
located site to protect the economic well-being of the state was in the
public interest. The case relies to a large extent on Courtesy Sandwich
Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Authority,37 where the court upheld the use
of condemnation power in furtherance of the New York World Trade
Center project. The court concluded:
The Act is not invalid because it does not freeze future use to present
circumstance. Nor does it violate the cons:itutional prohibition because it
authorizes the use of space not needed for 1:he purpose of the Center other
than for the production of incidental revenue, when, as here, that authoriza-
tion is a reasonable concomitant of a project on a public purpose ...
The Act as amended incorporates not only the legislative determina-
tion of the broad scope of the Center, but, at least by implication, looks to
the eventual expansion of the immediate use to which the Center is to be
put. No separate edifice is authorized for the purpose of raising revenues to
offset the expenses of the Center. The authorized use of portions of the
Center for the production of incidental revenue is not its primary purpose,
but is expressly made auxiliary to the accomplishment of the main purpose,
which is public.3
It is worth noting that the Maryland Port Authority would occupy only a
small fraction of the proposed building, some 30,000 square feet out of the
200,000 square feet proposed, while the remainder was to be leased to
marine-oriented private businesses.39
Ill. PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
One of the most financially attractive value capture techniques
involves development projects where public entities join with the private
sector to carry out a joint venture. Through such associations the govern-
mental entity has a real opportunity to share in the benefits that accrue
from its work on its primary mission. Along transit routes, shopping
facilities, offices and other commercial ventures will benefit considerably
from installation of the transit line, and the opportunity for the transit
37.1 12 N.Y. 1077, 239 N.Y.S. 2d 899, 190 N.E.2d 402 (1963),
38. 240 Md. 438, 444, 214 A.2d 761, 768 (Md.Ct. App. 1965).
39, Id, 240 Md. at 444, 214 A.2d at 768.
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authority to share in financial consequences of those benefits could ease
the economic burden oi transit improvements. Essential to public/private
partnership is public ownership of the land adjacent to a transit route
where joint developmen: can be carried out. Public ownership of adjacent
land will be in two forms: land condemned for such purposes or land
previously acquired for other purposes.
A. CONDEMNATION OF LAND FOR PUBLIC/PRIVATE
P ARTNERSHIP DEVELOPMENT
As set forth in earlier value capture discussions, courts have upheld
the acquisition of more land than was absolutely necessary for the precise
public purpose if the land was acquired for necessary ancillary services
(for example, parking lots for a transit station), for demonstrated future
needs, or to clear up o avoid "remnants." In addition, the courts have
upheld the acquisition oi land for the economic or physical protection of a
public investment. 40
1. Excess condemnation.
Where the purpose of the acuisition is not solely to recoup the cost of
a public venture, the acquisition of more land than is necessary for the
direct purposes of an authority's need is likely to be a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain, provided there is adequate statutory authority
and a good plan sufficiently indicating the purposes and need for such
land.41 The term excess condemnation is a poor one. It is clearly inappro-
priate. As Nichols points out at section 7,512242 the term is a misnomer
because it infers that more land is being taken than can be justified for the
public use. If this were really the case such a taking would be
unconstitutional.
New York has been a particularly active jurisdiction with respect to
excess condemnation. The local government section of the New York
constitution provides limited authority to take so-called "excess" land:
E. Local governmentc. shall have the power to take by eminent domain
private property within 1 heir boundaries of public use together with excess
land or property, but no more than is sufficient to provide for appropriate
disposition or use of land or property which abuts on that necessary for
such public use, and ti sell or lease that not devoted to such use. The
legislature may authorize and regulate the exercise of the power of eminent
40. Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation District, 153 Tex. 646,271 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ,
App. 1964), af'd, 350 U.S. 804 :1965); and Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York
Authority, 12 N.Y. 1077, 239 N.".S.2d 899, 190 N.E.2d 402 (N.Y. 1963).
41. VALUE CAPTURE POLICY, vol. II, supra n. 32.
42. 2A, NICHOLS ON EMINEN t DOMAIN (3d Ed. 1975).
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domain and excess condemnation by a local government outside its
boundaries.
43
In the case of In re Flatbush Avenue,44 the City of New York sought to
condemn more land than was necessary to carry out a street widening
program. The court upheld the power of the city to take the excess land,
although in the particular case the court barred the condemnation
because no purpose had been offered for taking the additional lands:
"[s]ince there is no statement of purpose this court will not attempt to
conjecture as to whether a public purpose is involved. [Tihis is a
defect which invalidates the proceeding .... .
As indicated above, the federal courts interpret the authority to
condemn property very broadly.46 In United States v. 187.40 Acres of
Land,47 the court dismissed the landowners' claim that the Secretary of the
Army lacked statutory authority to take certain land to be used in con-
structing a flood control project in accordance with plans and conditions
made after the commencement of the original project.48 The court was
there dealing with the Declaration of Taking Act,49 which does not require
proof of necessity for the taking of land. It was held that there was no
constitutional bar to "excess" takings in this fashion.
In Kentucky a form of excess conder7nation is clearly permitted by
statute for "ancilliary purposes. 50 Such power appears to exist under two
categories. First, a general condemnation enabling statute sets out a
broad range of uses:
'Public project' means any lands, buildings, or structures, works or
facilities (a) suitable for and intended for usE! in the promotion of the public
health, public welfare or the conservation of natural resources, including
the planning of any such lands, buildings, structures, works or facilities; or
(b) suitable for and intended for use for the purpose of creating or
increasing the public recreational, cultural arid related business facilities of
a community, including such structures as concert halls, museums,
stadiums, theaters and other public facilities, together with related and
43. Article 9, Section 1, Subsection E (emphasis added).
44. 60 Misc. 2d 1062, 304 N.Y.S.2d 552 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
45. Id. at 1068, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
46. City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1929), aff'd281 U.S. 431 (1930); See
Callies and Duerksen, Value Re-Capture as a Source of Funds to Finance Public Projects, 8 URB.
LAW ANN. 73 (1974); Value Capture Policy, vol. II, supta n. 32.
47. 381 F. Supp. 54 (Pa. 1974).
48. The court noted, "The judicial role in review o' condemnation cases does not encom-
pass the power of determining whether the land is actually necessary for the successful
operation of the project but only extends to deciding the propriety of the public purpose of such
acquisitions and the requisite statutoryauthority [citing cases]. Moreover, the taking of more land
than necessary is no defense to condemnation acquisition [citing cases]." Id. at 57. (cases
omitted).
49. 40 U.S.C. § 258(a) (1970).
50. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 58.010-.140 (1970).
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appurtenant parking garages, offices and office buildings for rental in
whole or in part to private tenants, dwelling units and apartment buildings
for rental in whole or in part to private tenants, commercial and retail
businesses, stores or other establishments, and any structure or structures
or combination of the foregoing, or other structures having as their primary
purpose the creation, improvement, revitalization, renewal or moderniza-
tion of a central business or shopping community, and shall also include
existing lands, buildings, structures, works and facilities, as well as
improvements or additions to any such lands, buildings, structures, works
or facilities.51
Second, a number of specific agencies are empowered to exercise
the power of eminent domain for a broad range of purposes. A govern-
mental agency empowered to develop a "capital plaza" or other public
building complex is specifically authorized to condemn not only lands,
buildings and public works "suitable for and intended for use as public
property ' 52 but also:
suitable for and intended for use for the purpose of creating or increasing
the public recreational, cultural and related business facilities of a com-
munity including such structures as concert halls, museums, stadiums,
theaters, and other public facilities together with related and appurtenant
parking garages, offices and office buildings for rental in whole or in part to
private tenants, commercial and retail business, stores or other establish-
ments and any structure or structures or combination of the foregoing, or
other structures having as their primary purpose the creation, improvement
revitalization, renewal or modernization of a central business or shopping
community, and shall also include existing lands, buildings, structures,
works or facilities.53
The City of Lexington and Fayette, County have created the Lexington
Center Corporation to finance and develop a municipal convention center
and sports facility. The center is to consist of a trade show and sports
facilities complex containing a sports arena capable of seating 22,600
persons, connecting exhibition hall facilities of approximately 60,000
square feet, a restored opera house, and 70,000 square feet of commer-
cial parking space together with adjacent surface parking for over 2,000
cars.
Another example of excess condemnation is found in California
under the guise of the "protection" theory. A new eminent domain statute
specifically authorizes "protective acquisitions":
(a) Subject to any other statute relating to the acquisition of property,
any person authorized to acquire property for a particular use by eminent
domain may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property
51. KY. REV. STAT. § 58.010(i) (1970).
62. Id.
53. Id.
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necessary to carry out and make effective the principal purpose involved
including but not limited to property to be used for the protection or
preservation of the attractiveness, safety, and usefulness of the project.
(b) Subject to any applicable procedures governing the disposition of
property, a person may acquire property Linder subdivision (a) with the
intent to sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of the property, or an
interest therein, subject to such reservations or restrictions as are neces-
sary to protect or preserve the attractiveness, safety, and usefulness of the
project.5 4
Apparently, public agencies are now in a more favorable position to
make protective acquisitions. The new Eminent Domain Law does not
contain any distance limitations for protective acquisitions and basically is
a codification of existing California case law which permits "taking inci-
dental property to carry out and make effective the principal uses
involved. '5 5 In addition, similar authority is spelled out for the California
Department of Transportation:
The department may condemn real property or an interest therein for
reservations in and about and along and leading to any State highway or
other public work or improvement constructed or to be constructed by the
department and may, after the establishment, laying out and completion of
such improvement, convey out any such real property or interest therein
thus acquired and not necessary of such improvement with reservations
concerning the future use and occupation of such real property or interest
therein, so as to protect such public work and improvement and its environs
and to preserve the view, appearance, light, air and usefulness of such
public work; provided, that land so condemned under authority of this
section shall be limited to parcels lying wholly or in part within a distance of
not to exceed one hundred fifty feet from the closest boundary of such
public work or improvement; provided that when parcels which lie only
partially within such limit of one hundred fifty feet are taken, only such
portions may be condemned which do not exceed two hundred feet from
said closest boundary. 56
2. Future Uses.
Future use is a well recognized "excess" or supplemental condem-
nation power.5 7 For example, the California state highway department
(CALTRANS) is expressly empowered to condemn land for future use,
and to lease such lands until they are needed for public use.
The authority conferred by this code to acquire real property for state
highway purposes includes authority to acquire for future needs ...
54. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1240.120 (West Supp. 1976).
55. City of Santa Barbara v. Cloer, 216 Cal.App.2d 127, 30 Cal, Rptr. 743 (1963).
56. CAL. STS. AND Hy. CODE §104.3. (West 1963) (repealed 1975).
57. Callies and Deurksen, Value Recapture ac: a Source of Funds to Finance Public
Projects, 8 URB. LAW ANN. 73, 81!-83 (1974).
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The department is authorized to lease any lands which are held for
state highway purposes and are not presently needed therefor on such
terms and conditions as the director may fix and to maintain and care for
such property in order to secure rent therefrom.58
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has upheld condemna-
tion in advance of actual need. As part of a plan for improving the port area
a harbor district intended to construct a liquid storage tank on the
expropriated property, even though it could not say with assurance when
the land would be so used. 59 The court was unmoved by the fact that only
one private user might actually take advantage of the bulk storage facility.
According to the court, this fact did not affect the public use nature of the
taking because all potential users would have access to storage in the
area.
3. Remnants.
The same reasoning is also applicable to the acquisition of more
interests in land, in order to eliminate remnants, than can be justified by
the particular public purpose upon which a particular acquisition is
based. In Southern Pacific Land Company v. United States,60 the court
upheld the decision of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy to condemn a
fee simple title to a tract of land including mineral interests for the
construction of a naval air station in California, despite the owner's
objection that he was willing to sell the surface rights, but wanted to retain
the mineral rights. The court relied on the rule cited above that the exact
nature or estate to be acquired is solely within the province of the public
official involved. In fact, the court propounded the rather startling theory
that "advantageous liquidation of the government's interest is a legitimate
consideration in determining the estate to be taken," and that "approp-
riate liquidation of investment for public purposes [is] itself such a public
aim."61 The acquisition of land for the sole purpose of turning around and
selling at a profit would presumably be illegal under the Vesterdecision.6 2
The result of the above case, however, appears to be that a federal
authority may acquire more land, or at least more interests in land, than is
riecessary for the public purpose, where the property perchance had to
be disposed of, such further acquisition of rights or interests would protect
the government's investment or increase its total value! 63
58. CAL. STs. AND HY. CODE § 104.6. (West 1963).
59. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal District v. Henning, 409 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1969).
60. 367 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1966).
61. Id. at 163.
62. City of Cincinnatti v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1929), aff'd 281 US. 431 (1930).
63. Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation District, 153 Tex. 646, 271 S.W. 2d 137 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964), affd350 U.S. 804 (1965); Rindje v. City of Los Angeles, 262 US. 700 (1923); United
States v. 2,606,548 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970); People v. Merced County, 68
Cal. 2d 206, 436 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1968).
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California has what is probably the least restrictive case law on the
subject of remnant acquisition by eminent domain. The California Streets
and Highways Code provides:
Whenever a part of a parcel of land is to be taken for state highway
purposes and the remainder is to be left in such shape or condition as to be
of little value to its owner, or to give rise to claims or litigation concerning
severance or other damage, the Department may acquire the whole parcel
and may sell the remainder or may exchange the same for other property
needed for state highway purposes.64
The statute was construed and upheld in People v. The Superior Court of
Merced County65 in which the Supreme Court of California held that even a
'remnant" as large as 54 acres could be condemned under the remnant
theory of excess condemnation when it could probably be condemned for
a little more than the cost of taking the one-half acre needed for highway
purposes, and paying damages for the remainder which would thus
become land-locked:
Although a parcel of 54 land-locked acres is not a physical remnant, it
is a financial remnant: its value as land-locked parcel is such that sever-
ance damage might equal its value. Remnant takings have long been
considered proper.66
There are no outright examples of excess condemnation in our
example jurisdiction of Colorado. However, the acquisition of land for
public/private cooperation in development is not restricted to the indus-
trial East. In Duff v. City and County of Denver,67 the City of Denver sought
to acquire by eminent domain Duff's land in order to expand municipally-
owned Stapleton airfield. The City and County of Denver contemplated
using the land sought for acquisition for supporting facilities such as
airplane parking areas, taxiways and similar purposes and for leasing to
base operators for activities similar to those being conducted on the
property (storage and servicing of private airplanes) by Duff. The court
dismissed without pause the contention that the ultimate purpose was
merely to change his private ownership to the private lease of the city
tenant and upheld the taking. 68
B. PUBLIC AND/OR PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT OF
PUBLIC LAND HOWEVER ACQUIRED
A second major opportunity for a transit authority to share in the
benefits of a new trarfsit route is through development of air or other
64. CAL. STATS. AND Hy. CODE § 104.1 (West 19133) (repealed 1975).
65. 68 Cal. 2d 206, 436 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1968).
66. Id. at 210, 436 P.2d at 346. This case has been the subject of statutory modification
seeking to reverse the court's decision, although the new statute has not been finally construed.
67. 147 Colo. 123, 362 P.2d 1049 (1961).
68. Id. at 123, 362 P.2d at 1049.
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property rights validly acquired by the authority but not needed for current
operations, i.e., land already in public ownership. There are many exam-
ples of courts upholding such development, and many more such
developments are proceeding without judicial review in other rapid transit
systems throughout the country. To some extent, the decisions discussed
here relate to those discussed above.
It has been noted elsewhere that although a governmental authority
may have sufficient power under common law to deal in air space, the safe
course is the adoption of a statute specifically allowing both sale and
lease of government-owned air space or land. 69 There are a number of
instances, particularly involving parking, of jurisdictions which authorize
the leasing or sale of air space.70
The use of air space or other public property for private development
is illustrated in the provision of offstreet parking. The acquisition of
property by a governmental entity for offstreet parking has generally been
held to be a public purpose even when such use has the effect of enabling
a municipal corporation "to enter into business in direct competition with
individuals who are now operating parking lots. ' '71 Parking is generally
considered to be public in character.
In fact, a recent Massachusetts case indicates that a municipality
may undertake to lease such facilities to private entities even in the
absence of statutory authority. In Ballantine v. Town of Falmouth, 2 the
validity of a town's action in taking property by eminent domain and
leasing it to a private party was challenged. The court said:
Even without explicit statutory authority, municipalities have the undoubted
right to lease real estate, land or. buildings held for public purposes and not
presently needed for such purposes. . . .A takingof premises for munici-
pal parking is not to be invalidated merely because some private benefit
may follow from the activities of the occupants of the vehicles parked in that
public parking area. 73
New York also provides an interesting legal backdrop for public/pri-
vate development in the predecessor to the Courtesy Sandwich case,
discussed above. The court considered whether construction by the Port
of New York Authority of a 16-story building was a proper use of property
condemned for Port Authority purposes.74 The street and basement floors
69. VALUE CAPTURE POLICY, VOL. II, ,supra n. 32.
70. Illinois, New Jersey, California, Washington, D.C. and Ohio.
71. 2 A. NICHOLS, ON EMINENT DOMAIN, section 7.5127, supra n. 32.
72. 713 Mass. Adv. Sh. 947, 298 N.E.2d 695 (1973).
73. Id. at -, 298 N.E. 2d at 698-99.
74. Bush Terminal Co. v. City of New York, 152 Misc. 144, 273 N.Y.S. 331 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
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would be used for the Union Truck Terminal while the upper 14 floors were
designed for revenue production in order to make the building self-
sustaining. The 14 upper stories were made available to various private
businesses wholly unconnected with transportation. It was alleged that
the erection and construction of the Union Terminal other than the street
floor and basement was not authorized, sanctioned, nor permitted by the
laws of the State of New York. The court thought not:
There can be little reason to doubt that the Port Authority was motivated
by nothing but a desire to further the pub'ic interest and carry out the
purposes of the compact and comprehensive plan when it caused Inland
Terminal No. 1 to be erected. The addition of the upper floors was merely
incidental. Without those floors it was impossible to construct the terminal.
The dominant object of the structure was its use for terminal purposes. The
Legislatures and Governors of both New York and New Jersey have
indicated that they entertain the same views. 75
The courts in New York have also held that where the fee to property is
in good faith appropriated for a particular public purpose, a municipality
may subsequently convert it to other uses, or even abandon it entirely,
without any impairment of the validity of the estate originally acquired.7 6
New York has spoken broadly about the power to convert redeveloped
land to private uses even if such land was acquired by eminent domain. 77
Much the same result was reached in Florida in City of West Palm
Beach v. Williams 78 where the city leased a gasoline station and restaurant
in a city-owned marina to a private corporation. While the court noted that
the leased lands were not "coupled with the issuance of bonds or with the
acquisition of land by purchase or eminent domain,' '79 the court specifi-
cally held:
It is well settled that municipalities may constitutionally acquire land by
purchase or by power of eminent domain anc then lease that land for public
use, . . or may use the proceeds of municipal bonds to build improve-
ments to be leased for public use. .... 80
The court went on to say that a municipality could not constitutionally
acquire land by purchase or eminent domain and then lease the land for
private use.
In Hawaii, where the City of Honolulu temporarily leased a building
situated on land which had been acquired for future use as a park, the
75. Id. at-, 273 N.Y.S. at 345. This case turned in part upon the fact that the Port Authority
did not have power to levy taxes and assessments.
76. Fur-lex Realty, Inc. v. Lindsay, 81 Misc. 29, 367 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
77. In re Glen Cove Urban Renewal Agency, 84 Misc.2d 186, 375 N.Y.S.2d 261, 264 (Sup.
Ct. 1975).
78. 291 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1974).
79. Id, at 576.
80. Id.
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court held that the rental was an appropriate exercise of due diligence in
maintaining the property until the public use was accomplished.81
Finally, two cases from Pennsylvania indicate that when a downtown
area is involved, especially where parking is concerned, a leasing
arrangement between public and private enterprise can be made to work.
In the first of the two cases, Seligsohn v. Philadelphia Parking Authority,82
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the validity of a lease agree-
ment between the authority and two department stores. The agreement
required the authority to condemn land in the vicinity of the department
stores and to erect a parking garage which would be leased to the two
department stores for operation as a public parking facility. In turn, the
department stores agreed to pay debt service rentals together with an
additional rental of $25,000 per year plus a percentage over a fixed
amount of gross receipts. Title to the project was to remain with the
authority. Other merchants attacked the agreement on the ground that this
property had been condemned by the authority, not for public purposes
but to build the lot so that the two department stores would benefit by
having a publicly financed parking facility available for use by their
customers. The attacking parties' business had been condemned to
make way for the project. The court held that the agreement was approp-
riate, noting that the authority had acted upon the advice of reputable
agencies which had indicated that a real need existed for a public parking
facility at that location.
A different result was reached in the later case. In Price v. Philadel-
phia Parking Authority83 several agreements were under consideration by
the court. The first was between the Authority and National Land Invest-
ment Company providing that the Authority was to purchase a block of
land in the center of Central Philadelphia. The Authority was then to
demolish the existing structures and build an 8-story parking garage on
the premises, with a capacity of 862 automobiles, at a cost of $8-9 million.
The garage was then to be leased to National for operation as a public
parking facility. The authority also agreed to lease the air space overthe
garage to National for the construction of a high rise complex containing
over a thousand units and rising 22 floors above the garage. National was
permitted the use of space on the ground and concourse levels for
commercial purposes. National was to furnish three separate rental
payments: debt service rentals, "Authority" rentals of about $25,000
annually, and certain excess rentals.
81. City and County of Honolulu v. Bishop Trust Company, 49 Haw. 494, 421 P.2d 300
(1966).
82. 412 Pa. 372, 194 A.2d 606 (1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 952 (1964).
83. 422 Pa. 317, 221 A.2d 138 (Penn. 1966).
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The second agreement pertaining to a Rittenhouse Square project
was nearly identical, with the developers authorized to build a 19-story
office building over an existing Authority garage in downtown Philadel-
phia. The developers were also given an option to purchase the entire
project for a sum ranging between 1 and 1 .3 million dollars after 30 years.
In both instances, the Authority had failed to negotiate with its private
sector "partners" through competitive bidding.
The court invalidated the National project on the ground that the
private benefits greatly outweighed those cf the public and that therefore
the public participation and grant of governmental benefits to private
parties would be impermissible. The Rittenhouse Square project was also
voided because, as with the National project, it had been consummated
by private negotiation rather than competitive bidding. The court did not
find that the agreement constituted a private rather than a public purpose
as it had with the National project.
It has been suggested that one rationale for upholding the Rit-
tenhouse Square project and not the National project would be that the
former involved the erection of a privately owned office building atop a
pre-existing Authority parking garage, indicative of a real need for off-
street public parking. The public benefit having already been established,
it would, it has been suggested, be inappropriate to test the validity of the
arrangement since the public benefit had already been proven to exist by
the presence of the parking garage at that location. The National project,
on the other hand, looked too much like a "package deal" since the
construction of both the public and private structures were contemplated
as part of one continuous activity.
In any event, it is clear that at least part of the court would have
decided otherwise on the public purpose benefit issue. Writing for three
of the eleven justices, Mr. Justice Musmanno pungently castigated the
majority for their narrow interpretation of the public interest:
A more specific, salutary agreement, conducive to the best interests of
the city of Philadelphia, in keeping with the spirit of the times, and destined
to greatly benefit the motoring public, it would be difficult to find. It must be
stated at the very outset that the cost of the public parking facility portion of
the Academy House Project will be financed entirely by the Authority's
revenue bonds. In turn, the lessee (National Land) will pay as part of the rent
all sums necessary to meet the principal and interest on those bonds. Here
again, and this must be emphasized, not a single penny of pubfic funds will
be expended. Here indeed, manna will be descending from the top of the
skyscraper apartment house to an Authority, whose pantry needs replen-
ishment. The lessees will pay for every expense required for the construc-
tion of the building. What does the Authority give in return? The empty air
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above the garage. Could there ever be a more fruitful return than falling from
invisible trees growing above the top of one's own orchard?
What the Majority has done here is to substitute its own judgment and
its own views on strictly economic and administrative matters involving the
exercise of administrative judgment, for that of the Parking Authority
entrusted under the law to exercise that judgment. This it has no right to do.
[Schwartz v. Urban Redev., supra.] A reading of the Majority Opinion
against the background of the uncontested facts reveals that the Majority is
arrogating unto itself the powers and duties of a super Parking Authority,
which, it is unnecessary to state, it certainly has no constitutional power to
do.
8 4
Several jurisdictions have dealt with the problem of the leasing of city,
park and/or waterfront property for such uses as fishing piers, marinas,
and other private water-oriented business ventures. In Sunny Isles Fishing
Pier, Inc. v. Dade County 5 the Supreme Court of Florida considered an
appeal to set aside the leasing of a portion of a public park to a business
firm for the construction and operation of a fishing pier. The court noted
that no cost or expense to the county was involved, and that the portion of
the park being used was neither required nor in fact being used for public
park purposes.8 6 The court frankly characterized the issues as whether
Dade County had the authority to provide fishing facilities for the residents
and visitors in the county and to generate revenue for the county as well.
Among the key factors noted by the court:
A fishing pier is a very essential adjunct to the operation of a park of the
kind which the County constructed on this mile and a half of ocean frontage.
There are many benefits and advantages of such a facility in a resort area
that probably attracts as many fishing enthusiasts as any other section of
the world. The pier was constructed over a portion of the beach lying just
north of the inlet and in an area affected by eddies and currents and
undertows that render the use of the waters nearby dangerous to
bathers. . . . The amount of land actually involved is less than an ordinary
city lot and is in a public park comprising more than 140 acres. The amount
of ocean front used is only a small fraction of the total ocean front and the
construction of the pier over that small portion of the beach to all practical
purposes probably adds to rather than detracts from its availability to the
public. It is certainly a use incidental to the main operation of this large
public park .... 87
With respect to the matter of revenue, the court then quoted extensively
from its earlier opinion in Gate City Garage, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville
84. Id. at -, 422 Pa. at 156-59 (emphasis added).
85. 79 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1955).
86. Id. at 668.
87. Id. at 669 (emphasis added).
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dealing with the propriety of a long-term lease to a private party of a filling
station in a large public parking. area:
Constructing and leasing a filling station in a parking lot the size of that
contemplated is a mere incident, the primary purpose being to acquire and
construct a parking lot to serve a public arid municipal purpose.88
Continuing with its own analysis, the court observed:
A factor of importance is that for the use of this 40 feet of beach, the
County is guaranteed a minimum rental of $3,500 per year and has as
security for the payment of that rent a facility worth more than $150,000,
which becomes the County's property at the end of the term of the lease or
as provided in the lease in the event of a breach of material condition
thereof. This type of public financing shoLId be encouraged rather than
condemned. It has a tendency to preserve private enterprise of which this
Court has had much to say [cases omittec].
Moreover, had the County concluded to construct this fishing pier and
run it as a part of the public park, open to the use of the public without
charge, which it had the legal right to do, the situation then would have
resulted in appellants, who are conducting a private.enterprise of a similar
nature a short distance north of the public p er, operating their enterprise in
competition with a similar projct financed out of public funds.89
Largely to the same affect is the Rhode Island case of Thompson v.
Sullivan,90 where the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the lease of
a city wharf to a yacht club was not invalid under a statute authorizing the
sale of city property whenever property was, in the. opinion of the City
Council, unsuitable or ceased to be useful for public purpose. The court
held that it was not required to pass upon the wisdom, reasonableness or
propriety of the City Council's action, once it had made the requisite
findings.
A similar result was reached in D. N. Kelly & Son v. Selectment of
Town of Fairhaven9 1 where a town, acting by virtue of statutory authority
permitting it to acquire by purchase or eminent domain approximately 31/2
acres of wharf property, leased part of it to a private company which
erected a building thereon.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the City of Minneapolis
had the power to lease land acquired for the purposes of a river terminal
but thereafter found unnecessary for such public use.92 In part relying
upon the earlier decision of Anderson v. City of Montevideo93 upholding
the leasing of an auditorium in a municipal building for purposes of
88. 66 So.2d 653, 658-59 (Fla. 1953).
89. 79 So.2d 667, 670 (Fla. 1955).
90. 88 R.I. 305, 148 A.2d 130 (1959).
91. 294 Mass. 570, 3 N.E.2d 241 (1936).
92. Penn-O-Tex Oil Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 207 Minn. 307, 291 N.W. 131 (1940).
93. 137 Minn. 179, 162 NW. 1073 (1917).
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showing movies, the court affirmed the opinion of the lower court which
had found specifically:
That the leasing of said premises by the defendant to the plaintiff is
proper and reasonably necessary for the proper and efficient operation by
the defendant of said public dock and river terminal. That the said leasing of
said premises will greatly promote the business and operation of said
public dock and river terminal, and that the making of said lease by the
defendant to the plaintiff is within both the express and implied authority of
the defendant and is a proper exercise of such authority. 94
Once again, there were specific statutes and charter provisions
permitting the city to take, hold, lease and convey all real, personal and
mixed property as its purposes might require.
The City of Los Angeles provides another excellent example for the
manner in which a city, with appropriate authority, can deal with excess
public land rights. Directly over a city-owned parking lot in the middle of
town, the City of Los Angeles has become the landlord of the Los Angeles
Mall Shopping Center, described by an information and instruction book
for potential tenants published by the City of Los Angeles as "a project of
the City of Los Angeles and the parking authority of the City of Los
Angeles." The site consists of a two-block area containing the shopping
center, four levels of underground parking beneath the center, public
parks and a series of pedestrian vehicular tunnels and bridges crossing
adjoining streets. The shopping center was constructed and is operated
solely by the City of Los Angeles. Lease terms are between five and
twenty-five years, and basically cover an area of approximately 125,000
square feet. It was developed at a cost of approximately $42 million.
Prospective tenants range from restaurants and banks to shoe repair and
passport photo shops.
Some caution, however, is in order as shown by State ex rel City of
Charleston v. Coghill.95 There the court held that legislation authorizing a
city to determine what amount of space in a public parking facility should
be leased to private enterprise was not an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power. 96
In light of some of the cases noted above, it should come as no
surprise that many transportation-related public entities engage in a
number of development projects with various private corporations and
other private groups.
94. Penn-O-Tex Oil Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 207 Minn. 307, 308, 291 N.W. 131, 132
(1940).
95, 207 S.E.2d 113 (S. Ct. W.Va., 1973).
96. The court noted: "Certainly the creation of aesthetically appealing, convenient, and
efficient downtown urban centers is a public purpose and may be considered in determining the
validity of a particular parking facility." Id at 118.
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The enabling legislation for the Chicago Transit Authority is fairly
typical. It expressly contemplates disposition of excess property by either
sale or lease:
The grantee may lease, sell or otherwise c ispose of any property in its
property accounts which is no longer necessa ry, appropriate, or adapted
to the proper operation and maintenance of tie Transit System.
Any property so sold or disposed of shall be removed from the property
accounts of the Grantee.
The net rental or net income arising from the leasing of any property in
the property accounts of Grantee shall constitute and be part of the gross
revenues of the Grantee but only so long as such property is used or useful
as operating transportation property. Chicago Transit Auth. Ord. (passed
April 23, 1945).
In a recently published CTA manual on real estate practices and
procedures, there are several examples in which the CTA holds property
used for private purposes:
1) Air spaces over transit lines and station facilities including station
parking lots;
2) Surface spaces over and alongside sub-surface transit facilities;
3) Surface spaces beneath transit facilities such as aerial structures;
4) Excess land lying outside of CTA right-of -way; and
5) Surface space required for future transil development such as the
expansion of parking facilities at station areas. 97
The manual goes on to state with respect to the dealings in such property:
9) Sale or long term grants of excess property rights within the developing
economic zones shall be deferred until substantial value appreciation
has accrued as a result of this development.
b) Generally, CTA participation will be through its land ownership,
with the aim of achieving optimum return while retaining maximum
control.98
Having acquired much of the system from a multitude of private rail
companies in the 1940's, the CTA also acquired a number of leaseholds
for activities such as newspaper and food vending. Although many of
these tenancies were year-to-year in nature, many have been continued
since the street railway "went public." Indeed, some of the stations are
even redesigned with these concessions in mind, not only because the
concessions are convenient, but because they provide income. Exam-
ples are the Bryn Mawr and Kimball, and Lawrence Avenue stops where
extra water and electricity lines were installed to provide for such
concessions.
97. Chicago Transit Authority Real tstate Practices and Procedures, CLAiMS LAW/REAL
ESTATE DEVELOPMENTS, Real Estate Section 29 (March 1975).
98. Id. at 31.
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Where the tracks of the CTA pass over Fullerton Avenue, the CTA is
presently negotiating for the construction of a building to be used for a
private business. This is apparently not an unusual practice. The CTA
owns approximately 150 commercial buildings under its elevated rights-
of-way in various parts of the city. The buildings themselves have been
acquired after the ground leases have run out and range from jewelry
shops to supermarkets. Income from the leasing of these properties
ranges from $1,200 to $30,000 per year. The tenants pay taxes on the
leaseholds so that Cook County is able to get a part of a normally exempt
property interest back on the ad valorem property tax roles. Moreover the
City of Chicago receives additional sales taxes, and the CTA further
benefits by the presence of a commercial venture under its right-of-way,
which helps to avoid what might otherwise be a high-crime location.
The Chicago Transit Authority also engages in considerable joint
development through leasing or selling some of its right-of-way. The CTA
permits the construction of buildings on property previously condemned
for turning circles for buses on CTA's bus routes, which it will eventually
take over when the ground lease runs out. In addition, the CTA regularly
leases or sells air rights over its rights-of-way and stations, often at a
considerable profit.
The BART system is also contemplating adding to its revenues by
leasing space in its publicly-acquired land. BART has issued several
policy statements (dated February, 1975) dealing with real estate and the
development of income from district-owned real property, as well as
special access to BART stations, plazas and parking lots. An excerpt:
The District will lease particular properties that are deemed to be located
within an economic impact area of a transit station and District real property
will not be sold where there is an obvious potential increase in value as a
result of the transit system.
All real property holdings shall be analyzed for alternative sale or lease
potentials which would be compatible with the construction, operation,
maintenance, security and aesthetic treatment of the transit system as well
as with community planning and zoning patterns. Accommodation of
compatible supplemental revenue-producing uses shall be considered in
the design, construction and operation of the system.
Excess real property shall be analyzed as to optimum timing for
disposal and for possible leasing advantages. Market analysis and timing
of disposal shall reflect good business practice. When analysis indicates
that disposal should be deferred, interim leasing arrangements should be
pursued to:
1) maintain properties in a neat and orderly condition,
2) serve useful individual and community purposes,
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3) reduce land maintenance and cleanup costs,
4) provide District income.99
The Policy on Special Access to BART Stations, Plazas and Parking
lots contains the following interesting provision:
Compensation should be obtained for all special access permitted to BART
underground stations and above-ground plazas and parking lots based on
the net enhancement in property or business values derived from such
access where such benefits exist. Costs of developing access should be
deducted from gross value increases to arrive at net enhancement values.
One method of doing this would be to amortize development costs and
apply them as access rental offsets. Compensation should be paid not only
for physical access, but also for visual access or exposure permitted by
BART such as for display cases and display windows fronting on BART
facilities or for improved light, air, and view derived from BART-controlled
access.
100
BART has received a recommendation from one of its consultants
that it develop an office building around its Lake Merritt stop to be
occupied in part by BARTand in part by other public agencies and private
interests. BART owns three blocks around this particular stop at which it
has its headquarters. BART approved a $1,000 a month rent for a visual
access window for a donut shop at one stop and at another BART is
leasing right-of-way space for parking. It has also received a proposal to
put a restaurant over the ventilation shaft of the Ferry Building stop. BART
also obtains revenue by leasing connections from its stops to commercial
premises such as Woolworth's, Wells Fargo Building and California Sav-
ings and Loan Association. BART officials are quick to point out that these
arrangements do not yet produce significant income. Rental income of
around $100.00 per month for the first ten years of the term appears to be
typical. They estimate that perhaps twenty-five such agreements have
been negotiated. So far BART has not participated directly in any air rights
development but only in leases for development when the whole fee,
excepting sub-surface rights, was acquired above its subway
right-of-way.
There is also considerable use of existing property for private
developments over the rights-of-way and at interchanges with respect to
various state highway programs. Most states expressly prohibit commer-
cial establishments in rights-of-way for freeways and controlled access
highways. However, in many states toll highways are expressly exempted
from this provision. For example, in Illinois the Illinois Tollway Commission,
99. Policy on Developing Income From District-Owned Real Property (BART POLICY STATE-
MENT, 1975).
100. Policy on Special Access to BART Stations, Plazas, and Parking Lots (BART POLICY
STATEMENT, 1975).
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established by statute to construct and maintain a toll-highway system, is
specifically permitted:
To contract with and grant concessions to or to lease to any person,
partnership, firm, association or corporation so desiring the use of any part
of any toll highways, excluding the paved portion thereof, but including the
right-of-way adjoining, under, or over, said paved portion for the placing of
telephone, telegraph, electric, power lines and other utilities and for the
placing of pipe lines, and to contract with and grant concessions to or to
lease to any person, partnership, firm, association or corporation so desir-
ing the use of any part of the toll highways, excluding the paved portion
thereof, but including the right-of-way adjoining, or over said paved portion
for motor fuel service stations and facilities, garages, stores, hotels and
restaurants, or for any other lawful purpose, except for the tracks for
railroad, railway or street railway use, and to fix the terms, conditions, rents,
rates, and charges for such use.101
Acting pursuant to such authority, the Tollway Commission has leased
space for five restaurants and ten gasoline service station establishments
both adjoining and over tollways in Illinois. The basic leases provide that
the Commission receives a percentage of the sale of the various products.
The leases run for 25 years. 102
This practice of leasing highway right-of-way is fairly widespread
according to a study on multiple uses of highway rights-of-way.10 3
Such development, however, pales in comparison with the ambitious
projects undertaken by the California Department of Transportation (CAL-
TRANS) both under and above its system of freeways. CALTRANS has
broad statutory authority to permit private development on its property:
The Department may lease to public agencies or private entities for any
term not to exceed 99 years the use of areas above or below state
highways, subject to such reservations, restrictions and conditions as it
deems necessary to assure adequate protection to the safety and the
adequacy of highway facilities and to abutting or adjacent land uses ....
Prior to entering into any such lease, the Department shall determine that
the proposed use is not in conflict with the zoning regulations of the local
government concerned.81
01. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 314a34(e) (1975) (emphsis added).
102. Pennsylvania's turnpike law contains a similar provision: "The Commission is hereby
authorized to fix, and to revise from time to time, tolls for the use of the turnpike and the different
parts or sections thereof, and to charge and collect the same, and to contract with any person,
partnership, association or corporation desiring the use of any part thereof, including the
right-of-way adjoining the paved portion, for placing thereon telephone, telegraph, electric light
or power lines, gas stations, garages, stores, hotels, restaurants, and advertising signs, or for any
other purpose, except for tracks for railroad or railway use, and to fix the terms, conditions, rents
and rates of charges for use." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 §652.15 (Purdon 1961).
103. National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Rep. 53, Multiple Use
of Lands Within Highway Rights-of-Way, 55-56 (1968).
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On the strength of its statutory authority, CALTRANS has issued a
series of implementing regulations,10 4 and has issued a statement
concerning air space leasing and a development program which states
CALTRANS' position with respect to its long-term program:
Long Term Lease Program
The primary objective of this program is to encourage the construction
of building improvements on Airspace. Many prime sites for the construc-
tion of building improvements on a long ternm lease are available. Develop-
ers are invited to present their proposed uses for Airspace. 105
Acting under its broad authority CALTRANS has leased space under
the Santa Monica freeway in Los Angeles for a 300 unit, 40,000 square foot
warehouse. Now completed, there is a waiting list to get in. At another
location along the same freeway ground was recently broken for a 40,000
square foot building with the underside of the freeway serving as a roof.
The construction of two or three 15,000 square foot buildings of the same
type is due to commence within the next few months.
In San Francisco the Department expects to break ground soon for a
car wash and service station similarly located under a freeway. There are
plans to do the same for automobile sales agencies.10 6 A $25 million
project will soon be underway on air space and land in a loop of the
Hollywood Freeway to contain a 16-story office building, three theatres
and a 16-story hotel. We understand there is also located in Sacramento
above the freeway the beginnings of a Holiday Inn.
Returning to Colorado, there are several interesting examples that
might be useful as precedent and guidance for the undertaking of
public/private development techniques. One of the most promising is the
statute creating the Moffat Tunnel Improvement District. The purpose of
the tunnel was to provide an avenue of communication through the
Continental Divide to "reduce the barrier which now separates the west-
ern portion of the state from commercial intercourse with the eastern
portion thereof." 107 The project was specifically declared to be a public
use even though not many persons "may enjoy it" and even though
persons using the improvement must pay for the privilege. 10 8 The statute
specifically sets out authority109 to acquire not only a tunnel site but such
other lands and approaches as may be necessary, and to exercise the
power of eminent domain when necessary to accomplish the purposes of
the Act. The Board governing the district is specifically given the power:
104. CAL. STS. & HY. CODE § 104.12. (West 1974) (emphasis added).
105. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, C.,L. STs. Hy. REGS. 70.001 (West 1975).
106. Id.
107. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-8-101 (1973).
108. Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District, 72 Colo. 268, 211 P. 649 (1922).
109. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-8-107 (1973).
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[Tbo enter into contracts for the use of the said tunnel, its approaches and
equipment, with persons and with private and public corporations, and by
said contracts to give such persons or corporations the right to use said
tunnel, its approaches and equipment for the transmission of power, for
telephone and telegraph lines, for the transportation of water, for railroad
and railway purposes, and for any other purposes to which the same may
be adapted.110
Litigation established that it was not necessary that rentals from the leases
be sufficient to pay the entire cost of the tunnel-amounting nearly to a
subsidy for the tunnel.111
It is also interesting to note that the State Highway Department in its
authorizing legislation is granted the power to acquire and dispose of
property for future needs and to lease any lands which are held for state
highway purposes and are not presently needed therefor, on such terms
and conditions as the Chief Engineer, with the approval of the Governor,
may fix. 112
Interestingly enough, however, a special section on Freeways and
Local Service Roads provides:
[N]o commercial enterprise or activity for serving motorists, other than
emergency services for disabled vehicles, shall be conducted or
authorized on any property designated as or acquired for or in connection
with a freeway or highway by the State Department of Highways or any other
governmental agency.1 3
It may be that this provision is confined in its application to the particular
highways noted in this section, and not to highways, turnpikes, tollroads
and toll tunnels generally. In any event, the absence of such a provision
dealing with rapid transit could be construed to mean that if such
limitations had been contemplated, they would have been inserted in the
statute. Their absence would therefore be added authority for permitting
such private uses on transit district property in order to generate a
revenue stream, an aspect of value capture.
IV. INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION/JOINT DEVELOPMENT
Another means by which a Transit District could accomplish "value
capture" is by means of intergovernmental cooperation. This might take a
number of forms. For example, a joint venture or some other type of
agreement may be entered into with an urban renewal authority,
110. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-8-108 (1973).
111. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District v. Denver and St. Louis Ry. Co., 45 F.2d 715 (10th
Cir. 1930); Denver and St. Louis Ry. v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District, 35 F.2d 365 (1Oth Cir.
1929).
112. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-210 (1973).
113. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-3-101(3) (1973).
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municipalities, or county and special district agencies in order to jointly
participate in the land use around transit stops. If the Transit Authority is
not able itself to recapture some of the value accruing to the property
surrounding such a stop, it may at least see that public benefits, both
financial and otherwise, accrue to other governmental entities. The ability
to enter into such agreements in some jurisdictions has been largely
dependent upon the existence of constitutional or statutory intergovern-
mental cooperation or agreement provisions, together with case law
interpreting the same. The case law on intergovernmental cooperation
and development, outside of service contracts, is sparse, although such
cooperation is apparently being pursued successfully in several parts of
the country.
The development of the Bay Area Rapid Transit System (BART) was
accomplished through a unique method of intergovernmental coopera-
tion. The California Health and Safety Code provides for limited inter-
governmental cooperation in the development of transportation systems.
Section 33448 provides:
In a county with a population of 4,000,000 persons or more, or in a city
of 500,000 persons or more, an agency may, with the consent of the
legislative body, acquire, construct, and finance by the issuance of bonds
or otherwise, a public improvement whether within or without a project area
consisting of a transportation collection and distribution system and
peripheral parking structures and facilities, including sites therefor, to serve
the project area and surrounding areas, upon a determintion by resolution
of the agency and the legislative body that such public improvement is of
benefit to the project area. Such determination by the agency and the
legislative body shall be final and conclusive as to the issue of benefit to the
proiect area.1 14
BART has had particular success with the utilization of joint powers
agreements entered into with cities and various special districts. Through
these, BART has regularly condemned land for transit stops not
only for its own purposes but for the municipal purposes of the local
government with whom it has entered into Ihe agreement. An example of
such agreement is one between BART, Oakland, Alameda County, and
the not-for-profit Coliseum, Inc., to constrLct a walkway to the Coliseum
Sports Complex from the BART station. Similar agreements between
BART and CALTRANS, in which CALTRANS acted for BART, resulted in
the acquisition of substantial portions of highway and rapid transit right-of-
way together with BART parking areas.
In Boston, the Boston Redevelopment Authority is undertaking a
venture at the old South Station, acquired in 1965 from the Penn Central
Railroad. After demolishing much of the original terminal, the land was
114. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33448 (West 1973).
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sold for the construction of a private office building and a Federal Reserve
Bank building. There are plans to construct a new "intermodel terminal"
for rail, bus and subway together with commuter parking. Private conces-
sionaires will be located in the complex. BRA is using HUD money for site
clearing and renovation. 115
The CTA has also entered into a number of agreements with other
governmental entities, such as the Metropolitan Sanitary District of
Chicago (MSD) whereby it leases properties from the MSD for certain of
its activities and leases to the MSD property for an MSD well site. In
another instance the CTA exchanged an easement, which was needed for
the construction of a University of Illinois hospital near the CTA structure
on Taylor Street, for land which the University held and which the CTA
wanted for the construction of a station.
Again returning to our Colorado example, the constitution of the State
of Colorado provides:
Nothing in this constitution shall be construed to prohibit the state or any of
its political subdivisions from cooperating or contracting with one another
or with the government of the United States to provide any function, service,
or facility lawfully authorized to each of the cooperating or contracting units,
including the sharing of costs, the imposition of taxes, or the incurring of
debt. 116
The Denver Urban Renewal Agency (DURA) has the power to con-
demn for the purposes of redeveloping a slum or blighted area, and, for
the same purpose, to engage in tax increment financing. We understand
the Denver Rapid Transit District is contemplating an agreement with
DURA whereby the RTD would lend to DURA sufficient funds to undertake
redevelopment, perhaps including the construction of a station with RTD
funds, to eventually be paid back through the instrument of tax increment
financing. By such an agreement RTD would obtain a station free of
charge and would make a substantial contribution to the development of
the community in the immediately surrounding area. It may be that some
sort of joint sharing of revenues or powers could also be worked out with
applicable urban drainage and flood control districts, special districts
(which may provide a range of services from flood control and public
service transportation to housing) 1 7 and with airport authorities, which
have broad powers of eminent domain."18
115. Rice Center for Community Design & Research, BUILT OR IMMINENT U.S. EXAMPLES OF
VALUE CAPTURE/JOINT DEVELOPMENT, (July 1, 1976) (unpublished study).
116. COLO. CONST. art XlV §18.
117. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-106(J) (1973).
11.8. Id.
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Some care must be taken in drafting such agreements and the
provisions by which the various parties thereto, being governmental
entities, are authorized to act. There appears to be some question, for
example, about multiple county districts embracing a number of home
rule cities, and the powers the general assembly can give to such districts
in matters of local and municipal concern.' " Care would need to be taken
to ensure that the appropriate municipal corporations are brought into
such agreements to the extent that anything falling uniquely in their
province would be contemplated by the parties thereto.
V. TAXING AND OTHER MONE-ARY TRANSFERS
A. Tax Increment Financing
Another value capture technique involves the use of taxing mechan-
isms, either in connection with, or separate from, the techniques noted
above. Basically, tax increment financing is a method by which one
municipal agency or corporation pledges all or a portion of the incremen-
tal tax revenue generated by public improvement or development created
and initially paid for by a second agency, to that agency in order to pay it
back. The amount pledged is generally from the ad valorem property
taxes from the district, and the incremental value thus accrued and
reflected in the ad valorem property tax is used to pay off the bonds issued
by the developing agency. This device is particularly popular among local
and federally-funded development agencies in order to undertake major
redevelopment projects. One of the major advantages of such a system or
technique is that no new taxes are levied or collected. Rather, the burden
falls upon whichever general purpose government is pledging the incre-
ments (or a portion thereof) created by the redevelopment. Unless an
inflation factor is plowed into the base, though, the tax revenues may not
keep pace. This device has generally been restricted legislatively to
development districts. Legislation so providing may be found in Califor-
nia, Montana, Minnesota, Kentucky, and, in bill form, in Illinois. The
Kentucky statute was recently struck down by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky as technically violating the terms of the Kentucky Constitution,
but the Court commented that: "We find no fault in the purpose or the
theory [of tax increment financing], but for the reasons that follow it is our
opinion that each of the acts transcends the limits of the Kentucky
Constitution." 120
119. Four-County Metropolitan Capitol Improvement District v. Board of County Comm'rs,
149 Colo. 284, 369 P.2d 67 (1962).
120, Miller v. Covington Dev. Authority, 539 S.W.2d I (Ky. 1976). The difficulty encountered
by the Tax Increment Act was that it permitted school districts to participate with the result that
taxes collected by a school district would be subject to a tax increment transfer and the funds
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As noted above, the Denver Urban Renewal Agency has such
authority. It is worth noting that the constitution of the State of California
was specifically amended to permit local development authorities to
engage in tax increment financing theoretically obviating the misfortune of
the Kentucky statute.121 The Constitution limits authority to engage in tax
increment financing to redevelopment authorities. During the first 2 years
of experience in California, $170 million worth of tax allocation bonds have
been issued by 26 different redevelopment agencies. Providing the
matter of legal authority could be solved, it could be useful as a technique
for the development of rapid transit as well.
Examples of the use of such techniques applicable to transit districts
are few and far between. As in previous sections, however, there is no
intrinsic reason why it would not be possible to analogize to other
situations involving local governmental agencies or, indeed, the local
governments themselves, to the extent the exercise of the power does not
depend upon being a general purpose governmental entity.
B. Special. Assessments
The use of special assessment districts is another technique whereby
a transit agency could effect value capture.
California is a pioneer in the enactment of special benefit assessment
legislation, which are particularly suited to transit purposes:
The legislative body of any city or the Board of Supervisors of any city and
county may establish one or more special benefit districts within the city
and county pursuant to this chapter. Any special benefit district may consist
of either contiguous or non-contiguous areas of plan within the city or city
and county. Each zone within a special benefit district shall be an area
adjacent to a station of the municipal transportation system or along the
route or lines of said system which the legislative body or Board of
Supervisors determines will receive special benefit by reason of the opera-
tion of transportation facilities but all zones within a special benefit district
would not be used directly for educational purposes. This the court held was strictly prohibited. In
a particularly zealous opinion the court unfortunately went on to say:
It is no answer to say that tax increments will be money the schools would not have had
anyway, because the fact is that neither could this portion of the tax increments ever be
realized except through taxes levied for and in the name of the common schools. It is
also irrelevant we think, that as a practical matter tax increment financing eventually will
increase the revenues of a school district by enhancing its tax base, or that redevelop-
ment of depressed areas may increase the average levels of student achievement by
improving the environment in which the student lives. Id. at 5.
Hopefully the formalistic rigidity of the Kentucky Supreme Court is not contagious or legislative
wisdom will overcome such difficulties through better draftsmanship or constitutional
amendment.
121. CAL. CONST. art. 16, § 16.
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need not be adjacent to the same station or adjacent to the same portion of
the route or lines.' 22
This special benefit district legislation serves several important
functions. First, it represents a declaration by the legislature that special
benefits may accrue to property along a mass transit line. Although a
property owner may claim that his land receives no special benefits,
courts generally give considerable weight to legislative determinations.
Thus, once a special benefit district is determined, should such power be
granted to a local transit district, the burden to show that certain land is not
especially benefited is placed upon the landowner. Second, the legisla-
tion specifically allows for the creation of several districts within one transit
area. The special district itself may contain separate zones. These provi-
sions give the transit district considerable leeway to apportion costs in
proportion to benefit. Instead of assessing only property adjacent to a
transit station, as would be the case with respect to the usual public
improvement situation, the district could set up zones with assessments
decreasing in proportion to distance from the transit stop, or in accord-
ance with some other formula.
We note in passing that this particular piece of legislation has never
been used, despite the fact that the mosi recent and modern of rapid
transit systems, the Bay Area Rapid Transit System, was constructed
during the 1960's in California. Ho{vever, much of BART's acquisition
program was completed by the time the "Mills Bill", quoted above,
became law. Moreover, on advice of counsel, BART officials were particu-
larly concerned with the affect of protracted hearings and litigation over
such a new financing technique. The Mills Bill requires a two-thirds vote in
order to provide for the bonding required. Moreover, the task of establish-
ing criteria for ascertaining incremental value was thought to be too
difficult, possibly leading to arbitrary decisions. It was considered that
sufficient benefit would accrue to BART from its ability to tax real estate
values in Marin County which would presumably generate increased
revenues as BART developed. Finally, it is worth noting that the Special
Benefits Assessment Act in California pertains only to land. It was appa-
rently never contemplated that improvements thereonwould be subject to
such a tax.
In New York, rapid transit lines were authorized to be constructed at
least in part by means of special assessments along the lines.123 We do
not know of any that were so constructed, however.
122. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 9900 et seq. (Deering 1968).
123. See BUILTOR IMMINENT U.S. EXAMPLESOF VALUE CAPTURE/JOINT DEVELOPMENT, supra n. 115.
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Another device is downtown mall construction, which is a close
analog to the transit-related special benefit assessment Mills Act in
California. Louisville, Kentucky has recently completed construction of a
downtown mall whereby adjacent commercial property owners were
assessed a portion of the cost of constructing the mall. The non-adjacent
owners could have been assessed if an appropriate finding of benefit had
been made by the Board of Aldermen. This particular method of assess-
ment was specifically authorized by a statute which comprehensively
describes both the procedure and the method of ascertaining such
special benefits.124
The legislative findings in terms of benefit and public purpose are
clear:
The general assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky finds as a fact that
the preservation of downtown areas of cities is vital to the health, safety and
material wellbeing of the citizens and inhabitants thereof, and that the
construction and installation of pedestrian mall projects will contribute to
the safe and effective movement of persons, and serve the public health,
safety, convenience, enjoyment and general welfare. The governing body
of a city, to protect and serve the public safety, convenience and welfare
and the interests of the public in the safe and effective movement of
persons, and to preserve and enhance the function, appearance and
economic viability of the central mercantile and business areas of such city,
may initiate, construct, install and establish a pedestrian mall project in the
manner herein provided, at the exclusive cost of the owners of land located
in the pedestrian mall benefit area, which is benefited by a pedestrian mall
project. 125
While it has been pointed out that such a technique used in connec-
tion with a transit stop might have a more difficult time in meeting a strict
benefits test, it would depend to a large extent on the law of the particular
jurisdiction. The type of analog that might well serve to persuade court or
legislature that property owners who are specifically benefited could
legally be taxed is exemplified by a recent Court of Appeals case from
Michigan. In Christoff v. City of Gladstone,1 26 four of eleven property
owners in the city complained of a special assessment levy for the laying
of water mains. Despite the fact that the suit below had been for injunctive
relief and that under Michigan law such equitable actions are reviewable
de novo, the court found no reason to overturn the lower court's finding. It
was held that where the property owners could be benefited by increased
124. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 93A.010(12) and 93A.030 (1970) (Emphasis added).
125. Compare Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §93A.020 (1971), with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §31-25-41 et
seq. (1973).
126. 65 Mich. App. 607, 237 N.W.2d 579 (1975).
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fire protection, assured safe water supply, and increase the market value
of their property, special assessment was; proper.
While it is not directly on point, the New York Supreme Court decision
in Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. City of New York,127 is interest-
ing. The report of the case sets forth the fact that income from concession
revenues at Grand Central Station, and real estate income from property
along Park Avenue, contributes to the ope ration of the two stations and is
worth fighting about. There is no evidence, however, that the transit
authority ever went out of its way to attempt to generate much revenue
from such value capture sources. Nonetheless, the 1973-1974 New York
Transit Authority's Budget Data and Transit Fact Publication 128 shows that
'other than passenger" revenue, consisting mainly of advertising, rentals
and miscellaneous, and station concessicns, amounts to some $8 million.
Of course, this needs to be compared to a total annual figure of
$538,295,000.00 for 1973.
In the review of materials with respect to monetary transfers, there are
several matters with respect to our example, Colorado, which might
be useful to note in this section. First of all, under Public Improvements,
there is a section dealing with public malls.129 Aside from providing
specifically that the legislative body of t-e city, in connection with the
establishment of pedestrian malls, may convey, lease or transfer parts of
malls in various ways, make improvements of any kind, including commer-
cial buildings and facilities and the like, it also authorizes the legislative
body:
(e) To pay from the general funds of the city from proceeds of general
obligation bonds from other monies available through the city from the
proceeds of the assessments levied on lards benefitted by the establish-
ment of q pedestrian mall, from funds raised through bonds issued there
against or from any other source whatsoever, the damages if any allowed or
awarded to any property owner by reason of the establishment of a
pedestrian mall and to make other provisions to secure the payment of said
monies as provided in Section 31-25-406.
(f) To pay from the general funds of the city from proceeds of general
obligation bonds from other monies available to the city from the proceeds
of assessments levied on property benefited by any such improvements
from funds raised through bonds issued payable from such assessments or
from any other source whatsoever the whole or any portion of the cost of
such improvements.
(g) To levy assessments against properties benefited by the proposed
pedestrian mall in an amount no greater than the total damages or compen-
sation paid to landowners or to assess such damages as part of the total
127. 47 N.Y. App. Div, 2d 10, 365 NY.S.2d 10 (1975).
128. See generally New York City Transit Authority Operating Budget - 1975.
129. COLO. REV. STAT ANN. §31-25-41 et seq. (1973).
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cost of the improvements made of the mall area so long as the amount
assessed does not exceed the special benefits conferred.130
While there is no particular definition of special benefits in the statute, the
wording quoted above does not seem to confine the levy of an assess-
ment for special benefits to abutting properties only.
It also appears to be the law in Colorado that to sustain a special
assessment it must appear that a benefit has been occasioned to the
premises assessed at least equal to the burden imposed. Nevertheless, it
is also true that a presumption of validity attaches to a city council
determination that benefits especially accruing to properties equal or
exceed the assessments thereon, and the burden is generally on the
property owners, who must affirmatively show to the council or other body
by substantial evidence, that the contrary is true. 131 It also appears to be
the law, according to the last cited case, that remote or contingent
benefits enjoyed by the general public will not sustain a special assess-
ment. However, it does not appear that the kinds of benefits which would
accrue to the owners of properties nearest or adjacent to a transit district,
together with others a bit further afield, would fall into the latter category.
Finally, the case of Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District,132
dealing with the construction of the Moffat Tunnel, indicates that the tunnel
was constructed by virtue of the formation of an improvement district with
the right to levy taxes for the construction of the said tunnel. Multiple
challenges to the imposition of the tax were turned back, and it would
appear that the case may be helpful precedent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The array of techniques for implementing value capture policy have
long since moved from the theoretical to the practical stage. Supplemen-
tal condemnation, joint development, air rights development, special
benefit assessments and tax increment financing-a// have their prece-
dents. Indeed, all are going forward-or have gone forward-
somewhere, whether beneath a freeway in California, at a central mall in
Kentucky, or at a bus turning circle in Illinois. The question is no longer
whether, but how, when and under what conditions will public authorities
be successful in reaping the fruit of their own efforts, hopefully to per-
petuate and enhance their contribution to the quality of life.
130. COLO. REV. STAT ANN § 31-25-41 et seq. (1973) (emphasis added).
131. See, Satter v. City of Littleton, 185 Colo. 90,522 P.2d 95,98 (1974); City of Englewood v.
Weist, 184 Colo. 325, 328, 520 P.2d 120, 123 (1974); Orchard Court Development Co. v. City of
Boulder, 182 Colo. 361, -, 513 P.2d 199, 202-03 (1973); and Ochs v. Town of Hot Sulphur
Springs, 158 Colo. 456, 407 P 2d 677.(1965).
132. 72 Colo. 268, 211 P 649 (1922).
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